Early+Accounts+of+the+Black+Hawk+War


 * Early Accounts of the Black Hawk War** Original Author: Micaela Luisa Martinez, A&S195 SP10 Revision Author:

The Black Hawk War, named for Indian leader Black Sparrow Hawk, was in response to whites’ attempt at possessing Native lands (Wikipedia). Black Hawk, a Sauk, led his army in a battle against the United States Army to force the increasing number of white settlers from off their land. The actual war was fought in 1832 in the Midwestern region of the United States. The United States eventually obtained 15 million acres (according to some sources) of Sauk and Fox land in a treaty, highly contested by Black Sparrow Hawk, but nonetheless ratified in 1804 (Efflandt, 1986). It is estimated that about 400-600 Native Americans died in the 17 week long war, while less than 80 whites were fatally wounded. The 28 years between the time the treaty was signed and the time war was declared marks a span of great tension as the white population swelled after the War of 1812.

Article seven of the treaty “lulled Indians into a false sense of security” as it permitted Native peoples to remain on their lands until white settlers purchased them from the government; but very quickly settlers pushed Indians farther west (Stark, 1984; 33). Black Hawk did not personally sign the treaty of 1804, but his village of Saukenuk, located near the confluence of the Rock and Mississippi rivers, was part of the estimated 50 million acres given away (Efflandt, 1986; Stark, 1984). Black Hawk’s famous temperament, along with the many inconsistencies surrounding the ratification of the treaty were “catalytic both in the inception of the war and in its’ tragic conclusion” (Stark, 1984; 32).

**An Alternate Perspective**

Hon Perry A. Armstrong, author of The Sauks and the Black Hawk War (1887), asserts that “[t]he origin of the Black Hawk War as given by the Sauks and Confirmed by their Agent was: A Dance and a Drunk” (58). This claim was born out of his need to “[write] up the Black Hawk War. . . in connected form,” meaning the immense, and arguably avoidable deaths that occurred during the battle were originally caused by a drunken dispute—not the familiar treaty of 1804. This treaty signed Indian land over to white settlers for a mere thousand dollars a year. In other words, while the treaty formerly initiated tension and eventual death between and among Natives and whites, a dance held in a “small settlement of semi-savage white people, known as the ‘Cuvier Settlement,’” sparked the first of many battles and injustices including the treaty of 1804 (58).

In this French settlement in 1804, a party emerged at which “whiskey was there in abundance,” but “lady partners were few of their own color” (59). Armstrong contends that Indian women were, however, plenty and they took “solid pleasure” in becoming drunk, which “they could generally accomplish in proper short time.” At one of the white settlers cabins, a dance between a Sauk chief’s daughter and a pushy, young white man resulted in her leaving the dance floor. The Sauk Chief realized what had happened and confronted the white man, demanding an apology. The white man assaulted the Indian, which eventually concluded with a “tomahawk. . . crashing through [the white man’s] skull” (60).

The author reveals that up until the release of his book, nearly 50 years after the war, the coverage of the battle had been “short of giving all the facts. . . a partial sketch on one side—that of the whites” (62). To better and more truthfully represent the extent whites had on the Sauk people, Armstrong included lengthy quotes of Sauk leaders, one being in relation to the alcohol: “I begged [the whites] to [not] sell my people whiskey. . . [at the party, we] broke in the heads [of the barrels] and poured out the whiskey. I did this for fear some of the whites might get killed by my people when they were drunk” (79). The adage of this information, whether true or not, not only shows Native Americans inability to stop drinking, but also places blame on their behalf for what transpired that night at the party.

In defense of and in accordance with the Native people, Armstrong comments “how smooth must be the language of the whites when they can make right look wrong and wrong look right” (80). This was said in regards to Indian people stating that their spiritual teachings taught them that land cannot be for sale; only things that can be picked up and carried off can be sold. Though the selling of alcohol and by creating a drunken people, whites confirmed that the Natives were in no position to successfully cultivate land. In reality, this production of “wrong,” through the whites’ creation on Native inadequacy via alcoholism, resulted in the “rightful” possession of Native lands by whites.

This interesting perspective of a drunken brawl sparking the events that led to the Black Hawk War may be one of fact or it may be one of its time. Meaning, in 1887, when this book was written, the understanding of the Indian may have been static; being one of a drunkard or a savage. While the author shares the sentiments of the Natives, mainly the white man’s wrongful dispositions, the suggested original portrayal of the supposed party may reflect a white American bias. Interestingly enough, the author does admit that we Americans are “remitted to [Indian’s] legends and traditions, which are always more or less mythical, extravagant, and unreal. . . [for] an Indian can be nothing if not mysterious, stoical and superstitious” (9). In this same discussion, the author asks his readers to “accompany” him “in drawing conclusions” throughout the book. This alone leads one to believe that his imagination was a great filler of events in recounting the Black Hawk War.

**Noble Chief Black Hawk?**

The Black Hawk War (1903), by Frank E. Stevens gives a very different outlook on the Black Hawk War and the portrayal of Black Sparrow Hawk himself. Most commonly the Indian leader is spoken of in a manner of awe for he stuck up for what he believed and for the welfare of his people. Stevens, however, through the collection of information since 1871, concludes that “[h]is every venture was made for personal aggrandizement or popularity. . . [and] his various conflicts with the whites [were characterized by his role as the] aggressor” (20, 21).

In the personal description of Black Hawk, Stevens contends that the Indian was:

Full blood Sac, five feet eleven inches tall in his moccasins; of broad but meager build and capable of great endurance. His features were pinched and drawn. . . in his later years it was his boast that he had worn the lock [of hair] with such prominence to tempt an enemy to fight for it. . . This Statement, however, must be received as a boast and nothing more. . . [as it was custom for Sacs to pluck] hairs from the scalp. . . and not confined to Black Hawk’s redoubtable person, as he would have us believe (17).

The overwhelmingly negative description of Black Hawk may be an attempt at blaming the war on the “brave,” who should not be confused with a “chief” of the Sac Nation (21). It is believed that the brave was “reckless [and] envious of others with greater influence or name” and he himself was famous for “breaking engagements and treaties [for] the greater part” of his life (20).

His “war-like spirit,” Stevens claims, and his “unjustifiable and unreasonable” hatred of whites served as the catalyst for eventual war (21). In Black Hawk’s own recollection of the treaty the he summed up in his autobiography stated: “from the day when the palefaces landed upon our shores, they have been robbing us of our inheritance, and slowly, but surely driving us back” (Efflandt, 1986; 1). Black Hawk’s other claim, that all Sauk chiefs did not sign the treaty was, as Stevens believes, “incorrect. . . [and] preposterous,” much like all else that the brave utters (Stevens, 1903; 33).

The author further claims that Black Hawk was delirious. Not only did he fail to realize that all Sac and Fox Indians recognized and honored the treaty of 1804, but that the treaty itself awarded the United States very little territory in the first place. In 1805, certain areas were being selected for military reservations and Indian posts, and suspicion arose on the parts of Natives as to whether provisions of the treaty were being violated with the land selections. With investigation, the Native people left with “assurances of good feeling,” all except Black Hawk. He approached the situation “bent on mischief” (37). Stevens concluded that the treaty of 1804 was ultimately “good if it helped Black Hawk and very bad if it contained anything good for the Americans” (71).

Once a prisoner, Black Hawk was recorded saying in the third person: “[y]ou know the cause of our making war. . . Black Hawk is satisfied. . . he has done his duty. . . the white man do not scalp the heads. . . they do worse—they poison the heart. Farewell to my Nation! Farewell to Black Hawk!” (239).

Frank E. Stevens retells the story of The Black Hawk War and of the brave Black Hawk as one of fault on the head of Black Hawk. In so many words, he claims that if only the selfish and greedy Indian leader had backed down quietly, the war would have never been. In essence then, the Black Hawk War, appropriately named, was in fact a war fought between one man and a nation. The other Natives, Stevens contends, were perfectly content with the provisions of the treaty.

**Works Cited**

Armstrong, Perry A. The Sauks and the Black Hawk War. Springfield: H.W. Rokker, 1887. Print. Retrieved from Historical Room at Moline Public Library.

“Black Hawk War.” Wikipedia.com.

Efflandt, Lloyd D. The Black Hawk War, Why? Rock Island Arsenal Historical Society, 1986. Print.

Stark, William F. Along The Black Hawk Trail. Sheboygan: Zimmerman Press, 1984. Print. Retrieved from Historical Room at Moline Public Library.

Stevens, Frank E. The Black Hawk War. 1903. Print. Retrieved from Historical Room at Moline Public Library.

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